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ABSTRACT 
Indonesia mempunyai masalah keagenan yang unik. Konflik antara prinsipal dengan 
prinsipal lebih mempengaruhi nilai perusahaan dibandingkan konflik antara prinsipal 
dengan manajer (agen). Kebijakan dividen memegang peranan penting dalam mengatasi 
masalah keagenan. Dividen dapat menjadi mekanisme pengikat (bonding) untuk mengikat 
kepentingan manajemen dengan kepentingan pemegang saham. Selain itu aliran kas bebas, 
dan aset sebagai kolateral (collateral assets) juga memegang peranan penting untuk 
mengurangi masalah keagenan antara pemegang saham dengan pemegang utang 
(debtholders). Aset kolateral merupakan mekanisme covenant utang untuk mengurangi 
konflik antara pemegang saham dengan pemegang utang (debtholders). Penelitian ini 
menguji hipotesis substitusi dalam teori keagenan antara dividen dan struktur kepemilikan 
(manajerial dan outsiders). Penelitian ini berargumen walaupun kebijakan dividen, dan 
struktur kepemilikan (manajerial dan outsiders) merupakan mekanisme untuk mengurangi 
konflik keagenan namun semua mekanisme yang ada selalu saling meniadakan, karena 
manajemen sangat memperhatikan biaya keagenan dari adanya pengendalian konflik 
keagenan. Sedangkan kaitan antara struktur kepemilikan, aliran kas bebas, dan aset 
kolateral juga mempunyai efek yang berbeda terhadap dividen. Penelitian ini menguji lima 
hipotesis yaitu hipotesis mengenai efek substitusi, aset kolateral, dan hipotesis pengaruh 
aliran kas bebas dalam menpengaruhi dividen dibandingkan dengan struktur kepemilikan. 
Sampel adalah perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta (sekarang 
Bursa Efek Indonesia) selama perioda 1995 sampai dengan 2004. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan model Logit dengan Andrew dan Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests, 
dan Wald test untuk menguji hipotesis. Hasil penelitian mendukung hipotesis substitusi, dan 
aset kolateral sebagai debt covenant. Hipotesis mengenai aliran kas bebas tidak terdukung. 
Hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa manajer tidak bersedia mengorbankan aliran kas bebas 
untuk pemegang saham, sehingga kebijakan dividen dalam mengendalikan konflik keagenan 
kurang efektif di Indonesia. Masalah keagenan melalui ekspropriasi aliran kas bebas oleh 
manajer tidak berdampak besar pada nilai perusahaan dibandingkan dengan ekspropriasi 
aliran kas bebas oleh pemegang saham mayoritas. 
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
“The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just 
don’t fit together” (Black, 1976). A number of researchers provide theoretical as well as empirical 
evidences on different aspects of dividend policy but many issues are still unresolved. 
As one of developing markets, Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) is likely to be quite different from 
what typically is the case in respect of an efficient market. Different capital markets have different 
behavior of listed companies. The behaviors of listed firms on the JSX are also different from the 
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companies listed on other market. The dividend policies of listed firms also assumed different. The 
behavior of the companies listed on the JSX appears different from what might be expect from the 
empirical findings derived from developed markets and knowledge of financial markets derived 
from finance textbooks. The research provides empirical evidences of agency costs on dividend 
policy in an emerging market (Jakarta Stock Exchange – JSX).  
As transparency international published their corruption perception index in 2005, Indonesia is 
rank 137 with score 2.2 along with Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Iraq, Liberia, and Uzbekistan. 
Their findings suggest that Indonesia is country with high level of corruption
2
. This study assumes 
that agency conflict in Indonesia is a corruption in firm level
3
. 
As agency theory argued that dividend policy is the mechanism of bonding to management 
behavior with regard to firm value. Dividend will decrease the ability of management to perquisites 
firm cash flow. Pinkowitz et al (2003) found that dividends are worth a lot more in countries with 
high corruption than they are in countries with low corruption. In other words, investors value cash 
paid out by the corporation in countries with high corruption because they have good reasons to 
expect that cash kept within the firm will be wasted or stolen. La Porta et al (2002) argues that 
country with lack investors protection will suffers from agency problems and prune firm value. Poor 
governance prevents investors from receiving the full return on their investment, because third 
parties pick off the fruits of those investments before they received. For instance, controlling 
shareholders in a company in Indonesia might siphon off earnings for their own profit rather than 
using them to provide a return to outside investors. 
Conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is the central discussion in agency 
theory literature. Several researches have been conducting to test the conflict and the affect to value 
of the firms. Major researches that tested ownership structure from agency theory perspective such 
as Jensen et al (1992), Morck et al (1988), McConnel and Servaes (1990), Holderness et al (1999), 
and Lemmon and Lins (2000). Mainly major researches conducted using developed country 
financial data. Generally, the researches found supporting result regarding ownership structure as 
mechanism to control agency problems. Managerial ownership, and outside ownership are among 
other the mechanism to control agency conflict. Managerial ownership and outside shareholders are 
use as mechanism to reduce agency conflict between managers and shareholders (agent versus 
principals’ conflict). Meanwhile outside shareholders mechanism also induce conflict between 
founder shareholders and managers (majority) with outside shareholders (minority). The issues of 
managerial and outside shareholders also test with regard their relationship to dividend policy as 
bonding mechanism of agency conflict. 
Eisenhardt (1989) argue that there are two paradigms of agency conflict, those are: (1) positivist 
agency theory and (2) principal-agent research. Positivist agency theory explains the conflict 
between principal and agent while principal-agent research elaborates the conflict between principal 
and principal, principal and customers, etc. Majority of empirical research in Indonesia based on 
positivist agency theory rather than principal-agent research. 
Free cash flow also becomes major issue in this research. This research argues that free cash 
flow will less employ as sources of management perquisites because bonding mechanism from 
dividend. Dividend will lower the chance of managers to use free cash flow for their own interest. 
As sources of perquisites, therefore free cash flow will have higher affect to dividend than 
ownership structure. Shareholders more concern on their fund invested in the firms, rather than 
concern on alignment of interest between parties.  
Meanwhile, debtholders more concern on fund invested (loan) and secure mechanism of their 
loan especially from nonperforming loan. High level of collateral assets will lower boundary of debt 
covenant and increase firm’s debt level. Substitutions hypothesis argued that debt and dividend have 
negative relationship because firms concern on cost of such policy. Therefore, high level of 
collateral asset will increase debt level, and lower dividend level. 
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Several researches in Indonesia such as Mahadwartha (2002a), Mahadwartha (2002b), 
Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002), Mahadwartha (2003), Tandelilin (2003), Ismiyanti and Hanafi 
(2003), and Mahadwartha (2004) also tried to examine the bonding and monitoring argument of 
debt and dividend policy. Generally, Indonesian empirical researches found significant support for 
balancing model of agency cost. Firms concern of cost arises from mechanism to reduce agency 
problems. The researches have not focused their findings on the differences between agency 
problems developing country versus developed country.  
This study argues that agency problems in Indonesia arises from inside versus outside 
shareholders, shareholders versus debtholders, and partially managers versus shareholders. This 
study argues that dividend as bonding mechanism have a lessen support as agency conflict reduction 
mechanism in Indonesian firms. Although several research such as Mahadwartha (2002a), 
Mahadwartha (2002b), Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002), and Mahadwartha (2003) showed a 
strong support for balancing model of agency cost in Indonesia, this study have not focused the 
argument on the balancing models nevertheless on dividend as bonding mechanism in agency 
conflict. 
1. Research Problems 
Four research problems formulate from the preface of this study and such problems will be 
hypothesize and test using appropriate statistical test. The research problems are: 
a. Does managerial ownership affect dividend policy? 
b. Does outside shareholder affect dividend policy? 
c. Does free cash flow affect dividend policy? 
d. Does free cash flow have higher magnitude (absolute) to dividend policy than ownership 
structures to dividend policy? 
e. Does a collateral asset affect dividend policy? 
2. Research Objectives 
Based on research problems discussed above, this research has four salient purposes, which are: 
a. To examine whether managerial ownership influences dividend policy as the control 
mechanism. 
b. To examine whether outside shareholder influences dividend policy as the control mechanism. 
c. To examine whether free cash flow influences dividend policy as the control mechanism. 
d. To examine whether free cash flow have higher magnitude (absolute) to dividend policy than 
ownership structures to dividend policy. 
e. To examine whether collateral asset influences dividend policy as the control mechanism. 
3. Research Contributions 
The results of this research project would contribute to improve understanding about dividend 
policy as bonding mechanism in Indonesia. The empirical results would also provide the 
information regarding effect of cash flow, collateral asset, and ownership structure on dividend. 
Capital market investors also could use the result as valuable information when conducting 
fundamental analysis on buy or sell decision, or constructing stock portfolios.  
Investors will have additional information to support their investment decision. Regulators can 
use the research result to arrange new rules and regulation based on agency conflict and increase 
minority shareholders protection against managers and majority shareholders disturbing actions. 
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4. Research Originals 
The conceptual framework proposed in this study is different to previous studies in some points 
of view. Firstly, this study is focusing on dividend hypotheses to test unique agency problems in 
Indonesia as representation of developing country. Previous empirical researches in Indonesia more 
concern on testing balancing model of agency theory. However, there is little attention about 
dividend as bonding mechanism in agency problems.  
Secondly, this study proposes dividend policy as binomial variable, based on preliminary 
financial data examination. Thirdly, in testing dividend hypotheses, this study focus on three 
conflict of interest between managers versus shareholders, inside shareholders versus outside 
shareholders, and shareholders versus debtholders. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate dividend policy has been an issue of interest in the financial literature. Thus far, that 
issue has been examining under the assumption that the firm is one homogeneous unit whose clear 
objective is to maximize its market value (Brennan, 1970; Miller and Modigliani, 1961; and Miller 
and Scholes, 1982). Dividend decision is one of the most important decisions of the company, and 
not surprisingly then a great many studies have already been published in this area but some 
important issues are remaining unresolved. 
This part of the paper contains an extensive review of agency cost theory of dividend policy 
along with major empirical evidences, and a brief summary table of the major studies on agency cost 
theory of dividend policy including the methods of analysis, data used and the notable findings. The 
previous empirical evidence supports that agency cost arises from conflict between 
shareholder-manager, and shareholder-bondholder. Generally, the previous studies also suggest that 
payment of dividend reduces the agency cost. The summary of the major empirical studies on 
agency cost theory of dividend policy along with their data set, methodology and the remarkable 
findings presented in Table 1. 
Agency cost is nothing but an implicit cost that usually arises for the conflict between managers 
and shareholders (principal and agent). Dividend policy will act as a bonding mechanism in agency 
conflict (Mahadwartha, 2004). The payment of dividend reduces the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989).  
Table 1. Summary of the Major Studies on Determinants of Dividend Policy 
Author Data Dependent 
Variable 
Method Findings 
Regarding the 
Agency Cost 
Theory 
Rozeff (1982) 1000 US cross sectional 
non-regulated firm from 64 
spans over the period of 
1974-1980 
Dividend Pay-out 
Ratio 
OLS Agency cost: 
Support 
Gerber (1988) Primary and secondary data Target Pay-out Ratio OLS Agency cost: 
Support 
Jensen, 
Solberg and 
Zorn (1992) 
Cross-section of 565 US 
firms in 1982 and 632 US 
firms in 1987 respectively 
Dividend Pay-out 
Ratio 
3 Stage Least 
Square (3 
SLS) 
Agency cost: 
Support 
Alli, Khan 
and Ramirez 
(1993) 
Cross section of 105 US 
non-financial sector over 
the period of 1983-1985 
Dividend Pay-out 
Ratio 
2 Stage 
Multivariate 
(Factor 
Analysis and 
OLS) 
Agency cost: 
Support 
Holder, Cross section of 477 US Mean Standard OLS Agency cost: 
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Langrehr, and 
Hexter (1998) 
firms over the period of 
1983-1990 
Deviation of 
Dividend Pay-out 
Ratio 
Support 
Saxena (1999) Cross section of randomly 
selected 333 NYSE listed 
regulated and non-regulated 
firms over the period of 
1981-1990 
Dividend Pay-out 
Ratio 
OLS Agency cost: 
Support 
 
Jensen (1986) documented if firms have free cash flows then they should pay dividends or retire 
their debts to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. In addition, a similar type of conflict exists 
between shareholder and bondholder because shareholders can expropriate wealth from 
bondholders by paying themselves dividends rather than their debts. Bondholders on the other hand 
will protect their investment through covenant on firm’s policies (such as dividend policy in the 
bond indenture) (Kalay, 1982). 
1. Hypotheses Development 
1.1. Shareholder-Manager Conflict and Dividend Policy 
Dividend can be used in reducing the agency problem between managers and stockholders. The 
payment of dividends reduces the discretionary funds available to manager for perquisite 
consumption and helps address the manager-stockholder conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Easterbrook, 1984; and Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). Agency theory argues that managerial 
ownership will align managers and shareholders interest and reduces agency conflict. Reducing in 
agency conflict will increase value of the firms significantly. 
Rozeff (1982) was the first explicitly recognize the role of insider ownership as one of 
monitoring role to managers. Firms establish higher dividend payouts when insiders hold a lower 
fraction of the equity and/or greater numbers of equity hold by outside shareholders. This evidence 
supports the argument that dividends payments are part of the firm’s optimum bonding package and 
serve to reduce agency conflict. Jensen et al (1992) examine the relationship between ownership, 
dividend policy and leverage, concluded that manager make financial policy trade off to control 
agency costs in an efficient manner. Balancing model of agency theory also tested by Mahadwartha 
and Hartono (2002) for Indonesian capital market (JSX). The research found that balancing model 
hold in Indonesia, and firms concern to minimize the trade off agency cost on debt and dividend 
policy. 
As developing capital market, this study introduces the Indonesian unique characteristic. Higher 
level of managerial ownership will decrease conflict with insiders’ principal, but increase the 
conflict between managers and inside shareholders with outside shareholders
4
. Hence, higher level 
of managerial ownership will decrease dividend payment, to support managers’ perquisites and 
insiders’ principal on firm value. 
H1a: Managerial ownership affect dividend policy with negative sign 
The balancing model also a relation between firm’s transaction cost and agency cost. If the firm 
pays high level of dividend to reduce firm agency cost and at the same time firms needs external 
funds for investment that raises firm transaction costs. Rozeff (1982) also attempt to examine trade 
off between transaction costs and firm agency costs. Rozeffs’ hypothesis concludes that if outside 
equity holders own a majority of the equity, they will demand a higher dividend as part of the 
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optimum monitoring package. Rozeff (1982) incorporated one variable as the percentage of stock 
held by managers. Rozeff predict that the dividend payout negatively related to the percentage of 
stock held by managers.  
The fraction of stock held by outsiders may not be the only determinant of dividend demand. If 
outsiders are minority shareholders, the firms’ ownership will be more concentrated and may more 
easily influence by insider behavior, thereby reducing agency costs and leading to lower optimal 
dividend payout. Hence, dispersion of ownership among outsider stockholders may influence the 
dividend decision, with more dispersion leading to higher dividends. 
As developing capital market, Indonesian capital market has lower dispersion of outside 
shareholders. Family ownerships have been dominating Indonesian listed firms, and have been 
suggesting that agency conflict between managers and inside shareholders minimum. Mahadwartha 
(2004) shows firms with higher level of institutional internal ownership have higher financial 
performance. Institutional internal was representation of family ownerships. The evident suggest 
that agency conflict shifted from principal versus agents to principal (founders) versus principal 
(outside shareholders). This study argues that lower level of outside shareholders will increase 
dividend payment, to fulfill founder shareholders personal wealth. 
Rozeff (1982) used the number of common stockholders to measure ownership dispersion. The 
prediction is that the dividend payout positively related to the number of common stockholders in 
the firm. To correct for scale affects, the variable taken by Rozeff as the natural log of the number of 
common shareholders. Rozeff found a significantly negative function of the firm’s number of 
common stockholders. Rozeff (1982) finally concluded that higher dividend payments reduce 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The result support by Miller and Rock (1985) 
that insiders’ ownership is relevant to assessment of dividend signals. 
On the other hand, Easterbrook (1984) observed whether dividend reduces agency costs and 
found to some extent different from others. Easterbrook (1984) found that dividend might keep 
firms in the capital market, where monitoring and control to managers is available at low cost, and 
useful to adjust the level of manager’s risk and the different classes of investors.  
H1b: Outside shareholders affect dividend policy with negative sign 
1.2. Free Cash Flow and Dividend Policy 
Jensen (1986) argues that if firm has free cash flow, it is better off sharing them with 
shareholders as dividend payout or retire the firm’s debt in order to reduce the possibility of these 
funds being wasted on unprofitable (negative net present value) projects and on personal interest of 
managers
5
. Jensen (1986) is famous as initiators of free cash flow model in agency conflict. 
Dividend initiation can reduce agency costs because they reduce free cash flow available to 
managers. Given the previous performance as proxy for efficiency in allocating funds, the relatively 
poor firm’s performance has more impact in reducing agency costs following dividend initiations 
(Lipson et al, 1998). On the other hand, dividend omissions can increase agency costs because they 
enlarge the free cash flow available to manager’s perquisites. However, the financial condition of 
firms at the time of a dividend omission may limit the degree to which agency costs can raise. Since 
many firms only omit dividends after experiencing financial problems, the funds retained rather than 
distributed as dividends should be closely monitor.  
Agency costs are more likely to increase following a dividend omission if the firm’s previous 
performance has not triggered closer monitoring of managers. That is, relatively poor performance 
prior to the dividend omission should automatically heighten monitoring of the firm’s manager, 
while relatively strong performance prior to the dividend omission enlarges free cash flow without 
necessary triggering closer monitoring of the firm’s managers (Akhigbe and Madura, 1996). 
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Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis indicates that when a firm has cash in excess of what 
is required to finance positive net present value (NPV) investment projects, it is better for manager 
to return the excess cash to shareholders as dividends in order to maximize shareholders wealth. 
Otherwise, he argues, the existence of free cash flow may lead management to undertake suboptimal 
investment projects. Moreover, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) called the extended form of the free 
cash flow hypothesis as the overinvestment hypothesis. If it is assumed that a firm’s investment are 
scale expanding and exhibit decreasing marginal efficiency of capital, an average Q
6
 less than unity 
implies overinvestment. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that the average return in response 
to announcements of sizable dividend changes is larger for over investing firms than for 
value-maximizing firms. 
It is shows that the size of the declared dividend is an increasing function of expected cash flow. 
Nevertheless, Bar-Yosef and Huffman (1986) observe a trend that the higher the level of expected 
cash flow, the lower the managerial effects of cash flow on dividends. In addition, a similar 
relationship observed with respect to changes in expected cash flows.  
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) investigated the informational content of dividends in the 
framework of the principal-agent conflict model developed by Berle and Means (1932) and 
extended by Jensen (1986). Lang and Litzenberger (1989), however re-examines the dividend 
announcements to determine whether the free cash flow has explanatory power. They concluded 
that free cash flow has explanatory power. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory lays the agency 
problem of managers and shareholders over the distribution of free cash flows generated by the firm.  
Mahadwartha (2004) support the argument that managers’ perquisite is higher for firms with 
high level of free cash flow. As free cash flow increase, shareholders will induce managers to pay 
dividend as bonding for managers’ perquisites. The study suggests outside shareholders will hurt 
more from this policy rather than inside shareholders (family shareholders). This study argues that 
firms with high level of free cash flow will have higher dividend payment as indications of 
shareholders’ bonding on managers’ perquisites. 
H2a: Free cash flow affect dividend policy with positive sign 
This research also argues that free cash flow will have higher magnitude to dividend than 
ownership structures. Managers more concern on free cash flow as perquisites than bonding from 
managerial ownership and outside shareholders. Mahadwartha (2005) shows that free cash flow 
significant variables (with greater magnitude) to affect financial performance on crisis than before 
crisis. Thus this research support Mahadwartha (2005) result that free cash flow will affect dividend 
with higher magnitude (in absolute term) than ownership structure (managerial and outsiders). 
H2b: Free cash flow affect dividend policy with greater magnitude (absolute) than managerial 
ownership and outside ownership 
1.3. Shareholder-Bondholder Conflict and Agency Cost 
Similar type of conflict like shareholder-manager also exists between shareholder and 
bondholder. Shareholders may expropriate wealth from bondholders by paying themselves 
dividends. Bondholders try to contain this problem through restrictions on dividend payments in the 
bond indenture (Kalay, 1982; and Smith and Warner, 1979). 
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that firms with more collateral asset have fewer agency 
problems between their bondholders and stockholders because these assets may serve as collateral 
against borrowing. Alli (1993) considered the ratio of net plant to total assets as a proxy for 
collateral assets and agency problem between shareholders and bondholders and expected a positive 
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relationship between collateral assets and dividend payout ratio. Therefore, they found a 
significantly positive relationship between collateral assets and dividend payout ratio. 
Contrary from Alli (1993), this study argues that firms with low level of collateral assets will 
pay more dividends and vice versa. This study suggests that low level of collateral assets will lower 
the indenture of debtholders to constraint dividend payment. In return, the conditions increase the 
agency conflict between shareholders versus debtholders. La Porta et al (2002) suggest that 
developing country have low level of investors’ protection. Indonesia as developing country also 
suggests having low level of investor protection
7
.  
H3: Collateral assets affect dividend policy with negative sign 
RESEARCH METHODS 
1. Data and Sample 
Samples are non-financial sector companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange over the period of 
1995-2004. Financial sector excluded from the sample because they maintain different type of 
accounting records and characteristics that makes a problem to cope with conventional accounting 
system. Empirical research in finance usually divided into regulated industry (firm) for financial 
industry (firm), and unregulated industry (firm) for non-financial industry (firm). 
It is worth to mention that some companies are exclude from the sample because either all of the 
company or market data of those companies are unavailable. So, the sample size became smaller 
than the actual companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The final sample consists of 158 Jakarta 
Stock Exchange listed non-financial sector companies. Data are balance sheet, income statement, 
and cash flow report from 1995 until 2004. Data collected from the full version and audited annual 
reports of the Jakarta Stock Exchange listed companies from 1995 to 2004. 
2. Variables 
Dividend Policy (DDIV). Dividend usually defined as dividend payout ratio (dividend divided 
by net profit after taxes). Two main problems arise from such measurement. Firstly, companies’ pay 
dividends in excess of net profit after taxes, and secondly some companies pay dividends when net 
profit after taxes is even negative. The payment of dividend from negative profit creates a 
discontinuity in the variable with negative values being rather meaningless. Preliminary data shows 
only 42% listed firms pay dividend from 1995 until 2002 and 67.3% pay dividend before 1998 
financial crisis. Hence, dividend data is not normal and inclined binomial. Therefore this study 
propose a dummy variable to proxy dividend policy (DDIV=1 for paying firm, and DDIV=0 for 
non-paying firm). 
Managerial Ownership (MO). Agency theory views that firms pay higher amount of 
dividends as monitoring and bonding package when insiders hold a lower percentage of common 
stock to reduce agency cost. The proportion of stock held by managers considered as the proxy of 
insiders’ ownership. 
Outsider Ownership (OW). As agency theory argues that widely spread ownership have more 
bargain power and more influence on management actions such as pay more dividends to control the 
influence of wide spread ownership and to reduce agency cost. The proportion of outsider common 
stockholders considered as the proxy of dispersion of ownership for agency cost arises for the 
conflict between manager and shareholder. 
Free Cash Flow (FCF). Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis suggests that firms with 
more growth opportunities have lower free cash flow and therefore, it needs to pay lower dividends 
to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis was supported by 
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Rozeff (1982), and Smith and Watts (1992). This study contradict from Jensen (1986), argues 
negative relationship between free cash flow and dividend payout ratio because a unique agency 
problems in Indonesian listed firms. This study used Hackel et al (1996) measurement of FCF with 
discretionary methods divided by total assets. 
Assets Total
DCEX  DOCO  TFCF
  FCF

  
TFCF = (OCR – OCO) – CEX 
OCR = operating cash inflows 
OCO = operating cash outflows 
CEX = capital expenditures 
DOCO = (OCO growth – sales growth)*(0,2 * OCO) 
DCEX = (CEX growth – cost of goods sold growth)*CEX 
OCO growth = (OCOt – OCOt-1)/OCOt-1 
Sales growth = (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest-1 
CEX growth = (CEXt – CEXt-1)/CEXt-1 
Cost of goods sold growth (COGS) = (COGS t – COGS t-1)/COGS t-1 
 
Collateral Assets (CA). The ratio of net fixed assets to total assets considered as the proxy of 
collateral assets. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest a positive relationship between collateral 
assets and dividend payout ratio because firm with more collateral assets have fewer agency 
problems between shareholder and bondholder which leads to the higher level of dividend 
payments. On contrary, this study argues that unique agency problems in Indonesia will induce a 
negative affect of collateral assets to dividend payment.  
Table 2 shows summary of independent variables and description of the variables. This study 
uses four independent variables and single dependent variables (dividend) that test dividend 
hypotheses. This study also include crisis period as control variable. Dummy crisis variable (DC) 
with cut off data 1995 – 1997 (DC=0) and 1998 – 2004 (DC=1) will be use as control variable for 
crisis period. 
Table 2. Description of the Independent Variables 
Issue Variables Proxies Calculation 
Dividend 
Hypotheses 
1. Insider 
Ownership 
2. Outsider 
Ownership 
3. Free Cash 
Flow 
4. Collateral 
Assets 
1. Managerial Ownership 
2. Proportions of Common 
stock held by outside 
shareholders 
3. Free cash flow Hackel, 
Livnat, and Rai (1996) 
4. Collateral Assets 
1. Proportion of Stock held by 
managers 
2. Proportion of Outside 
Common Stockholders 
3. Discretionary FCF divided 
by total assets 
4. Ratio of Net Fixed Assets to 
Total Assets 
3. Methods of Analysis 
This study uses Logit model to test the hypotheses, because dependent variable is dummy 
variable. The goal is to quantify the relationship between the individual characteristics and the 
probability. Test for Goodness of fit model is Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit 
Tests with binary logit Quadratic hill climbing. This research uses Wald-test to examine the 
differences of coefficients among parameters (Greene, 2000: 153). The Wald test computes a test 
statistic based on the unrestricted regression. The Wald statistic measures how close the unrestricted 
estimates come to satisfying the restrictions under the null hypothesis. If the restrictions are in fact 
true, then the unrestricted estimates should come close to satisfying the restrictions. 
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Logit model equation: 
DPR = α + β1 MO + β2 OW + β3 FCF + β4 CA + β5 DC + εt 
Note: 
DPR =  dividend payout ratio; dummy D=1 for dividend paying firms, and D=0 for non dividend 
paying firm 
MO  = managerial ownership; percentage of managers’ ownership 
OW  =  outside ownership; percentage of outsiders’ ownership 
FCF  =  free cash flow; Hackel, Livnat, and Rai (1996) 
CA  =  collateral asset; net fixed assets to total assets 
DC  =  dummy crisis, DC=0 for 1993-1996; and DC=1 for 1997-2004 
εt  =  error term 
 
Table 3. Test for Hypothesis 
Hypotheses Test 
H1a : Managerial ownership affect dividend policy with negative sign β1 < 0 
H1b : Outside shareholders affect dividend policy with negative sign β2 < 0 
H2a : Free cash flow affect dividend policy with positive sign β3 > 0 
H2b : Free cash flow affect dividend policy with greater magnitude (absolute) 
than managerial ownership and outside ownership 
β1 < β3 
β2 < β3 
H3 : Collateral assets affect dividend policy with negative sign β4 < 0 
 
Table 3 shows tests for coefficient parameters of four independent variables, represent for four 
hypotheses. The research framework shows in Figure 1 that explained the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables, and the sign of the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for independent variables. The independent variables are 
managerial ownership (MO), outsider ownership (OW), free cash flow (FCF), and collateral assets 
Dividend 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Outside 
Ownership 
Free Cash 
Flow 
Collateral 
Asset 
H1a (–) H1b (–) H2a (+) H3 (–) 
Ownership 
Ownership< FCF 
H2b 
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(CA). The result shows that there is 29.4% outsider ownership among firms, and only 1.1% is 
managerial ownerships. Free cash flow has the highest standard deviation than other independent 
variables. The result suggests that free cash flow fluctuated within and between firms’ years.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
This research uses four independent variables which are MO for managerial ownership, OW for outsider 
ownership, FCF for free cash flow, and CA for collateral assets. Period analysis from 1995 to 2004 with 1559 
firm years. 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MO 1559 0 0.7600 0.0116 0.0621 
OW 1559 0 0.9342 0.2940 0.1659 
FCF 1559 -329.8247 2647.4702 3.0663 80.4675 
CA 1559 -3.6275 1 0.5512 0.2489 
 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics with cut-off Crisis period (DC). The result shows 
managerial ownership lower during crisis than before crisis while outsider ownership remains 
constant. Free cash flow also lower during crisis meanwhile collateral assets slightly increase.  
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics with cut-off Crisis Period 
DDIV for dummy dividend policy, and DC for dummy crisis period with cut-off 1997. Total firms year for 
before crisis period is 474 (1995-1997), and crisis period is 1085 (1998-2004).  
Variables DC N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MO 0 474 0.0284 0.1067 0.0049 
  1 1085 0.0043 0.0199 0.0006 
OW 0 474 0.2943 0.1407 0.0065 
  1 1085 0.2939 0.1759 0.0053 
FCF 0 474 4.8872 122.7296 5.6372 
  1 1085 2.2708 52.2663 1.5868 
CA 0 474 0.5188 0.1983 0.0091 
  1 1085 0.5654 0.2669 0.0081 
DDIV 0 474 0.93 0.255 0.012 
  1 1085 0.39 0.489 0.015 
 
Table 6 shows the result of independent sample test (Levene and equality test) between before 
and during crisis period. Levene assumed that variances of the two groups are equals. The result 
shows that managerial ownership, outsider ownership, and collateral assets have significant 
differences before and during crisis period. Meanwhile free cash flow shows insignificant result. 
The result suggest that although free cash flow increase between period, the magnitudes statistically 
indifference with zero. Levene’s test for outsider ownership is significant while t-test equality 
showed insignificant result. The test suggests that outsider ownership have different variances 
between groups. 
Table 6. Independent Sample Test for with cut-off Crisis Period 
Total firms year for before crisis period is 474 (1995-1997), and crisis period is 1085 (1998-2004). Levene’s 
and t-test of equality of means used to test data differences between before crisis and crisis period. 
Variables Levene’s F test t-test Equality of Mean Mean Difference 
MO 179.7525 *** 7.1728 *** 0.0241 
OW 40.4468 *** 0.0415  0.0004 
FCF 2.0418  0.5904  2.6164 
CA 19.5571 *** -3.4134 *** -0.0466 
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DDIV 1815.7586 *** 22.5588 *** 0.5359 
*) 10%; **) 5%; ***) 1% significant level. 
Table 7 shows independent sample test for Levene’s and t-test equality of mean with cut-off 
dividend payment (DDIV). The result shows that all variables statistically significant using 
Levene’s test. However, free cash flow insignificant using t-test equality of mean. The result suggest 
that firms paying dividend and non-paying dividend have different magnitude of managerial 
ownership, outsider ownership, free cash flow, and collateral assets.  
Table 7. Independent Sample Test for with cut-off Dividend Policy 
Total firms year for non-paying firms is 690, and paying firms is 869. Levene’s and t-test of equality of means 
used to test data differences between non-paying and paying firms. 
Variables Levene’s F test t-test Equality of Mean Mean Difference 
MO 30.3736 *** -2.9429 *** -0.0093 
OW 17.7294 *** 2.3692 ** 0.0200 
FCF 7.9441 *** 1.4602  5.9891 
CA 23.3783 *** 9.5568 *** 0.1179 
DC 3887.1719 *** 22.5588 *** 0.4597 
*) 10%; **) 5%; ***) 1% significant level. 
The differences of managerial ownership between paying and non-paying dividend is negative. 
Firms that pays dividend have lower managerial ownership than firms with no dividend do. The 
dividend paying firms decrease when economic environment enter crisis period. Majority of firms 
have financial difficulties and reallocated there cash to support day-to-day operation, and strengthen 
their assets. 
2. Regression Result and Goodness of Fit Tests 
Table 8 shows LOGIT regression result with dummy dividend as dependent variable. All 
variables are statistically significant and showed negative magnitude to dividend payment except for 
constant variable. McFadden R
2
 showed 25% explanation level of independent variables to dividend 
variable.  
Table 8. Regression Result of Logit Model 
MO for managerial ownership; OW for outsider ownership; FCF 
for free cash flow; CA for collateral assets; DDIV for dummy 
dividend policy (dependent variable); and DC (control variable) for 
crisis period. Period analysis from 1995 to 2004 with 1559 firm 
years. 
Variables Coefficient 
Constant   4.1733 *** 
MO 1 -1.9433 * 
OW 2 -0.6613 * 
FCF 3 -0.0015 ** 
CA 4 -2.3171 *** 
DC 5 -3.1129 *** 
McFadden R
2
  25%  
DDIV = 0  690  
DDIV = 1  869  
*) 10%; **) 5%; ***) 1% significant level. 
Managerial ownership negatively affects dividend policy (H1a not rejected). Outsider ownership 
has negative magnitude toward dividend (H1b not rejected). Free cash flow has negative effect to 
dividend policy (H2a rejected). Collateral assets have negative effect to dividend policy (H3 not 
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rejected). Meanwhile, crisis period have negative effect to dividend policy, as support by t-test in 
Table 7. 
Table 9 showed goodness of fit test for regression model in Table 8. The test divided 
observation into ten category based on their risk (the magnitude of their prediction from actual). The 
result showed that Hosmer-Lemenshow and Andrew statistically significant of 1%. Table 10 
supports the result of Table 9. Table of prediction divide model into two main categories. First 
category is estimated model, which shows estimation result from the original model. Second 
category shows constant probability model, which is depend on modified original model into 
LOGIT model with constant probability of dependent variable (dividend). 
Table 9. Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Logit model tested using Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow. Total observation will divided into 10 (quantile). 
Expected value of DDIV = 0 and DDIV = 1 then estimate using Logit model from Table 8.  
No 
Quantile of Risk DDIV=0 DDIV=1 Total H-L 
Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
1 0.0205 0.2436 128 122.626 27 32.3739 155 1.12753 
2 0.2442 0.3019 130 113.403 26 42.5971 156 8.89581 
3 0.3022 0.3614 102 104.277 54 51.7227 156 0.15001 
4 0.3615 0.4169 101 95.2438 55 60.7562 156 0.89324 
5 0.4177 0.4761 69 86.7914 87 69.2086 156 8.22069 
6 0.4768 0.5539 63 75.7404 93 80.2596 156 4.16549 
7 0.5540 0.8303 64 61.1103 92 94.8897 156 0.22464 
8 0.8381 0.9253 14 15.3804 142 140.620 156 0.13745 
9 0.9254 0.9500 8 9.57072 148 146.429 156 0.27463 
10 0.9500 0.9999 11 5.85654 145 150.143 156 4.69340 
Total 690 690.000 869 869.000 1559 28.7829 
H-L Statistic: 28.7829 Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.0003 
Andrews Statistic: 32.1094 Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0004 
 
The prediction showed that even model predicted using different methods the proportion of 
correct prediction (65.62% and 50.66%) is higher than incorrect prediction (34.38% and 49.34%). 
The result of goodness of fit model and prediction evaluation support that LOGIT model statistically 
fit. 
Table 10. Prediction Evaluation 
The test using Binary Logit Quadratic Hill Climbing with 1559 firms year and success cut-off = 0.5 
 Estimated Equation Constant Probability 
 DDIV=0 DDIV=1 Total DDIV=0 DDIV=1 Total 
Total 690.00 869.00 1559.00 690.00 869.00 1559.00 
Correct 421.98 600.98 1022.96 305.39 484.39 789.78 
% Correct 61.16 69.16 65.62 44.26 55.74 50.66 
% Incorrect 38.84 30.84 34.38 55.74 44.26 49.34 
 
Table 11 showed Wald test of hypothesis H2b. Wald test analyzed differences between β1 and β3; 
and β2 and β3. The equation are β1 = β3 or β1 – β3 = 0; and β2 = β3 or β2 – β3 = 0. The result of Wald 
test on β1 = β3 showed that magnitude of free cash flow to dividend lower than the magnitude of 
managerial ownership to dividend (H2b rejected). The result of Wald test on β2 = β3 showed that 
magnitude of free cash flow to dividend lower than the magnitude of outsider ownership to dividend 
(H2b rejected). 
Table 11. Wald Test H2b; β1 = β3 and β2 = β3 
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Wald test is use to test hypothesis H2b, with β1 = β3 or β1 – β3 = 0; and β2 = β3 or β2 – β3 
= 0. β1 is coefficient for managerial ownership. β2 is coefficient for outsider ownership, 
and β3 is coefficient for free cash flow. 
Wald Coefficient
a
 Differences 
β1 – β3 MO = 1.9433 > FCF = 0.0015 1.9418 * 
β2 – β3 OW = 0.6613 > FCF = 0.0015 0.6598  
*) 10%; **) 5%; ***) 1% significant level. 
3. Discussion 
Table 12 showed summary of statistical result of five hypotheses. Three hypotheses confirm as 
predicted, which are H1a, H1b, and H3. Managerial ownership negatively affects dividend policy. 
Firm that has managerial ownership less likely to pay dividend because managerial ownership and 
dividend policy are bonding mechanism on agency theory perspective. If one mechanism already 
exists then other mechanism less likely used to control agency conflict. Firms concerned on cost that 
occurred when they used bonding mechanism to decrease agency conflict. The result supports 
substitution hypothesis of agency cost (Mahadwartha and Hartono, 2002; Mahadwartha, 2002b and 
2003; Ismiyanti and Hanafi, 2004).  
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Table 12. Summary of Statistical Result 
Hypotheses Result 
H1a : Managerial ownership affect dividend policy with negative sign Not Rejected 
H1b : Outside shareholders affect dividend policy with negative sign Not Rejected 
H2a : Free cash flow affect dividend policy with positive sign Rejected 
H2b : Free cash flow affect dividend policy with greater magnitude (absolute) 
than managerial ownership and outside ownership 
Rejected 
H3 : Collateral assets affect dividend policy with negative sign Not Rejected 
 
Firm that has outsider ownership will less likely use dividend policy to control bonding 
mechanism. The argument is the same as managerial ownership, and the result confirm that 
substitution hypothesis hold in such situation. Firm with high collateral assets will has lower 
probability to pay dividend. This study argues that low level of collateral assets will lower the 
indenture of debtholders to constraint dividend payment. 
Free cash flow has negative effect on probability of dividend payment. High free cash flow will 
decrease the probability firm pays dividend. The research suggests that managers with free cash 
flow will reluctant to pay dividend and uses free cash flow for their own interest. Jensen (1986) 
argued that agency problem arises from expropriation of free cash flow by managers. The result also 
suggests that dividend ineffective as bonding mechanism for agency problems and firm that have 
high free cash flow will have high agency problems. Indonesian firms less consider to use dividend 
as bonding mechanism. Research data showed that 690 firm’s years are non-paying firms (44.25%) 
and 869 firm’s years are paying firms (55.74%). The data also support the use of dummy variables 
as proxy for dividend. 
The effect of managerial ownership and outsider ownership to dividend policy is higher (in 
absolute term) than the effect of free cash flow to dividend policy. The research suggests that 
ownership structure is more effective to control agency problems than using free cash flow. 
Manager’s have higher control on free cash flow for Indonesian firms, and induce them to 
expropriate free cash flow. Mahadwartha (2006) showed that managers have more chance to 
expropriate cash flow when firms have lower investment opportunity. The expropriation problems 
become severe when economic condition is unfavorable (crisis period).  
Collateral assets have negative effect on dividend policy. Firms that have high collateral assets 
will have fewer agency problems between bondholders and stockholders because these assets may 
serve as collateral against borrowing. Firms that concerned on cost to control agency problems will 
have lesser dividend when they have collateral assets to control the same agency problems. The 
result supported Titman and Wessels (1988). This result also suggests that low level of collateral 
assets will lower the indenture of debtholders to constraint dividend payment. 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
1. Conclusion 
The research have several conclusion based on the hypotheses. The conclusions for this 
research are: 
1. Managerial ownership has negative effect on probability of dividend payment. High managerial 
ownership will lower the probability of dividend payment. The result supported substitution 
hypothesis of agency theory. 
2. Outsider ownership has negative effect on probability of dividend payment. High outsider 
ownership will lower the probability of dividend payment. The result supported substitution 
hypothesis of agency theory. 
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3. Free cash flow has negative effect on probability of dividend payment. Managers reluctant to 
pay dividend and will expropriate free cash flow for their own interest.  
4. The effect of managerial ownership and outsider ownership to dividend policy is higher (in 
absolute term) than the effect of free cash flow to dividend policy. 
5. Collateral assets have negative effect on dividend policy. Firms that have high collateral assets 
will have fewer agency problems between bondholders and stockholders because these assets 
may serve as collateral against borrowing. 
2. Suggestion 
The result has several suggestions for policy maker, shareholders, bondholders, and future 
research. Policy maker will have to emphasize the protection of shareholders interest especially 
from manager’s perquisites. The result will provide shareholders with important information on 
firm’s free cash flow and their rights for dividend payment. Shareholders will force managers to pay 
dividend and reduce agency problems. Agency conflict between managers and shareholders lies 
beneath the use of free cash flow by managers for their own interest. Shareholders have to 
implement tight control on the use of free cash flow, especially for firm with lack of investment 
opportunity or in sudden economic shock (crisis).  
Bondholders will cover from agency problems when firm have high level of collateral assets. 
The result suggests bondholders to use collateral assets as indicator of financial competences. Future 
research might as well enhance research issues on free cash flow, dividend, and other financial 
policies as well. Future research should try to proxy dividend using dividend payout ratio, and test 
the argument on different sector. 
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